Collective Political Decisions

I am still trying to make a reply to Anonymous's comment

A much more robust and satsifying system than American or Australian 'democracy' with a proven ability to function in a multicultural environment. referring to the very democratic Swiss model.

There is some things we can learn by How animals make collective decisions, and the point I was trying to make was that I judge collective systems by how regularly they come up with the "right" decision over how regularly they reflect majority opinion.

The recent Australian stimulus package wrangle was a case in point. With the Swiss model they would be wrangling longer, and come up with a worse "populist" decision in the end anyway. The Australian senate is unequalled in both investigating policy and in coming up with appropriate amendments quickly.

Pro ? part two

My first elaborate post on the future of abortion predictably only garnered comments from Dr. Clam, but that is ok. I know there are a couple of other interested readers (eg Lexifab???), but I really wanted to knuckle down on breaking down the discrepancies between our future visions (which we believe to be realistic within our lifetimes). These seem to be:
1) The plausibility of the commoditisation of surrogacy/adoption/fostering such that it impacts on the demand for abortions.

2) The plausibility of artificial wombs as a way to replace abortions with transfers of the fetus to be incubated, then brought up by interested NGO's or government organisations.

Obviously from my posts and comments I believe 1) to be plausible and 2) not to be plausible, and I guess these were implied axioms in my argument that contradict Dr. Clams'. These points deserve more attention a they are fairly definitive points of difference.

As for the first one, there is a tension between very strong instincts to favour bringing up ones own genetic offspring rather than an adopted child. For example, the amount parents are willing to pay for an IVF surrogacy of their own DNA ($100,000) over the cost of an overseas adoption ($20,000) demonstrates both that there is already a nascent (or limited) market for babies, and that there is a distinct tension between what buyers expect, and what sellers can readily deliver. I believe that gradual increased scope of these markets, combined with reduced natural fertility from couples that desire a baby will erode that tension. ie. as it gets harder and harder to fall pregnant (compared to the whims of the individual), naturally and then via IVF etc., domestic paid-for adoption will become more attractive. As the demand for babies goes up, so will the price, changing the economic calculus of those who would otherwise have an abortion. There is obviously more to it than just that, but the cost of BRINGING UP a baby is usually the primary concern more than the cost of bringing the baby to term. The choice at the moment is mainly economic. If the choice is between abort and adopt, abort brings the better individual outcome (for the parent). If it was between abort and sell, it would depend on the price, and the imagined future for the child.

To point 2: I strongly believe that breakthrough artificial womb technologies will be irrelevant to replacing abortion. My objections are two fold -
a) I don't believe it to be technically feasible.
and
b)It presumes a certain societal dynamic which contradicts the societal dynamic that I perceive.

To start with, I don't believe that just because neonatal units can keep babies alive if born at 24 weeks, that an "unwanted" pregnancy that reaches that point ought to be terminated by caesarian section and the baby fostered out. Increased survival rates for premature babies does not translate to earlier separation of mother and child being a good idea under any imaginable circumstance.

The societal dynamic of abortion that is ignored is that for an aborting mother the concept is of a reversal of the pregnancy. The early removal of the live fetus is not the same thing, and if it was the mothers decision, the perceived effectiveness of the receiving entity to deal with children would be the deciding factor. In a society where pregnancies were automatically registered at conception, sexual norms would radically alter depending on various laws, changing the whole spectrum of who's pregnancies would become unwanted in ways dependent on a number of independent variables. In itself the extra option of early live removal of a fetus will not be perceived as a replacement for abortion by women with undesired pregnancies any more than adoption is now.

Geopolitical game theory rules

I have often mentioned game theory, rules, and the UN in the same sentence. Do not mistake this for a belief that the UN is of any relevance at all as a lawmaker in itself. Not only that, Australia would be my first choice as a world government, followed by the USA. The UN as a "government" is a toothless paper tiger and not capable of governing.

The set of treaties that have been signed by countries *does* determine the structure of the game and the moves each country can reasonably make. Thus, no matter what in theory the UN "decides", for instance on Iraq - the US being a security council veto member could not be stopped by the UN itself, but only by the domestic voting public that cared about what the UN decided.

Similarly with Russia in Georgia, China in Tibet, and in some way - Israel in Lebanon and now Gaza. The UN is important only in the sense of the importance of the individual treaties to the actions of various countries.

Thus several theoretically sensible annexations or merging of countries are very very unlikely due to the dynamics associated with how those treaties associated with the UN manifest themselves in Geopolitics.

Thus to consider entertaining possibilities like Australia annexing Pacific states etc., a new post-UN world order would have to be assumed first.

Back to cold war style imperialism

It appears there is a resurgence in cold war strategy that is apparent in Georgia. Russia had always preferred bullying in the old "East Bloc" and "Soviet Union". These were not necessarily voluntary unions but ones that were enforced from time to time. The US tended to use money handles to get "client states" on side, and eventually, this proved to be the key to the breakdown of the soviet empire. Communism was an inferior economic model, and its lack of democracy meant it could not adjust appropriately through succession of leaders and failing economies. Thus it appears that although the borders have changed dramatically, the upgraded economics and transformed country altogether have allowed Russia to actively assert its geopolicy of old, which seems to only require a strong military, and complete control over its media. The only tactic that is plausibly optimal for the US is also the Cold war tactics of old - ie. money and military support for client states. There was a nash equilibrium for a long time throughout the cold war with the stalemate perpetuated by Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD). The stalemate only ended when the USSR no longer had enough money to continue its strategies. Russia may yet again be vulnerable from say, a commodities bust economically, or a leadership succession issue politically, but these really cannot be counted on in the short term. Thus I foresee a solidification of the front line of the cold war in the Caucauses, and veiled threats of Great escalation as a way to manipulate policy in the future - virtually a return to MAD, in fact. China may well join the fray in imperialism of its own with its front lines of Taiwan etc.

What does Marconomics say about who is to blame for the war in Georgia?
Marconomics states that that is the wrong way to think (see principle 6). Blame in this case implies that there exists an impartial international court that can *both* judge and enforce its findings. Attempting to come to conclusions based on evidence as to who is to blame is putting the cart before the horse. The rules of the game in this case have as the highest court the UN security council. Thus if any of the veto-wielding members are part of the conflict, they cannot be effectively policed, except via threats by one of the other veto-wielding countries.

How did Russia "Win"
There are several strategic masterstrokes that Russia has made in the leadup to this conflict. Of course, in the long run, by the mere dint of the fact that they were "surprise" tactics which humiliated "the west" this will hurt Russia dearly (eventually).

One masterstroke was to give Russian citizenship to South Ossettians who wanted it. I have often thought that giving US citizenship easily to Iraqis (or Bosnians, Kosovars...)under occupation etc. could be easily turned to the US's strategic advantage.
Another smart move was to use the media cleverly to demonise Georgias leadership. As a "nominal" democracy, it is clear that the Russian population is right behind Putin, and think that the Georgian leader (Saakashvili) should be crushed like a bug because they believe him to be a tyrant. It wouldn't surprise me if in ten years, Russians rue the fact that they didn't go all the way and finish the job, much as the US rue the fact that Saddam Hussein wasn't brought down back in Gulf War I.
The tactical masterstroke was to predict Saakashvili's moves, and swiftly orchestrate counter-moves which included extensive propaganda. Staged and prepared propaganda from media fully under your control will always play better than even "nominally" fair and free western style press. Nobody believes the media to be impartial anyway, so it is better to go the whole hog and be as brazenly biased as people can believe.

Given that "true" democracies with "free" press have such a strategic liability over a system like Russia's, does this mean that the political/media systems in Russia (and China) are better than the west's?

No. The long term adaptability of true democracies and the truth-seeking nature of private, free media are decisive in the long run, even given their short term strategic liabilities.

Alternate Narrative on Mesopotamia

In response to:
Doctor Clam's elegant intellectual take on attitudes to war in Mesopotamia
Who is after an alternate intellectual narrative (from the left)

I have the following link to offer with my recommended comment snipped.

Economist article on Iraq, Iran and US


Azr@el wrote:
May 10, 2008 17:13
Where does the economist find such clueless journalist? Look at the problem from the desired end results from the view of the three outside players involved; what is an ideal Iraq in Iranian eyes? What is an ideal Iraq in Sunni Arab eyes? What is an ideal Iraq in U.S. eyes? The Iranian's want a demilitarized Iraq run by Shia's with a friendly Kurdish choir. Their tool to achieve this goal? The ballot box and a little ethnic spring cleaning of recalcitrant Sunnis. Their major problem? Pan-Arabist Shias trying to hijack the show. Sunni Arabs? They want a strong man of Sunni Arab persuasion to restore the good old days of pre-Kuwait Saddam. Their instrument? Money to al-qaeda-lite, political isolation of the Shia Iraqi government and of course foreign Sunni fighters by the truckload. Their major obstacle? History and demographics, neither favors them. The U.S. ? No one, especially no one in the white house has the slightest clue what an ideal endgame would look like.


The point being that it is very much (at least) a three entity game even in its simplest working model. There appears a distinct possibility that each entity is following optimal strategies,there is a Nash equilibrium of sorts, and that the endgame is a generation away. The "oil security" issue will only gradually improve, as the main players realise that security is unlikely to get much better or much worse for a long time yet.

Strategic analysis of Global warming

From Marconomica Principle #5 I've grouped entities strategically as countries. In the global scale, it is countries leaders making the commitments on behalf of all their citizens. The Dillemma's leaders of democracies face is that signed committments get votes now, but may lose them votes if they fail to achieve them later, or if it ends up costing more than voters are willing to pay. The over-riding strategic concern must be "the tragedy of the commons". I have imagined scenarios in which generalised fears cause emmissions to accelerate, with every country more or less blaming every other country. Individual countries obviously try to make any committments at such a long term as to ensure they won't lose personally by failing. As the long term committment nears maturity, the gap between the committment and reality will be so wide that no Government would accept responsibility. The proposed targets are framed in such a way that it is only the end result that is being argued over - not anything in between that will necessarily have to happen to get there (eg goals within an electoral term window). Examples that perhaps ought to be copied if we were serious about it, have their own horrors associated. For instance, Russia is the only Kyoto ratifier to obviously achieve their goal. Clearly, having an economy tank is an obvious way to reduce emissions, but no environmentalist is seriously suggesting it (except Peter Garrett before he became a politician:)). Also examples of rich countries with a very low carbon intensity exist (France), but this contradicts heavily with environmentalists hatred of Hydro and Nuclear power (and hatred of France). Having all but strategically ruled out strategies with proven records, my prediction is of a 10% increase in emmissions in developed countries by 2020 (from 2000 figures)

Where's the figures?

This article states confidently that Australia's emissions grow at twice the rate of other rich countries but was there a link to the data? Does any bloody news service that rants about global warming ever make the data demonstrating latest trends that they mention available? Nope. Where does this place Australia in its notional Kyoto targets that we didn't sign? Until the latest (but not linked) figures we appeared on target. I am quite for the concept of exporting emmissions to exempt developing countries like Indonesia etc. This may invoke a much more rapid transfer of real wealth to the third world, as we tax our Carbon highly, and they can remain exempt gaining a competitive advantage. And the nice thing about competitive advantage is that it isn't a "freebie" like aid, grants, tarriffs or oil resources. They still have to work hard and competitively to take advantage of the advantage.

On the latest posturing of "players" in the "global warming" game, there appears little prospect of (global) emmissions reductions for at least a couple of decades. Plus the moral hazard is just too great. I reckon if (global) emmissions are at 120% of current emmissions by 2030, we will be doing well. The only thing left to guesswork is who everyone is going to blame.

Vote Labor???

We need a higher unemployment rate. It's not just that I like Kevin Rudd somewhat, and that the economic action is concentrated in water trading (and carbon trading). I am being selfish in this instance because a higher unemployment rate is good for small business owners. Ok, so it's not so good for the country as a whole, nor for the newly unemployed, but quite frankly, that's their problem. Kevin Rudd's IR policies are not laid down in stone, but the noises are in the direction of winding back selected workchoice legislation. What would be typical in Australian election campaigns is that the wind back is "minimalised" by the policy wonks. This is a strategy to maximise votes. Why advertise a complete windback when any windback more than the Liberals are promising will achieve the vote of the interested individual.
The "Labour supply shortfall" is an illusion based on the "lump of labour" fallacy. Low unemployment rates have the tendency to give that illusion. The difficulty in finding employees is real, and scaring (all the other) employers away from hiring is the only realistic avenue to making it easier. The unfair dismissal legislation is the obvious choice for a minimalist windback. This will scare the bejeepers out of most small businesses from employing (or even to dismissing while it is still legal) while my own analysis shows these fears to be somewhat overplayed or irrational. This is why on balance it would play in my individual favour.

Blah Blah Game Theory Blah Blah

I am probably not saying anything original by feeling that "Stable democracies" are an artifact of the "political game" establishing a "Nash equilibrium", ie. one where the "players" are each following optimal strategies. (I am asserting that) The resulting policies, economic growth, employment etc. that arise are a result of where that equilibrium is for that particular country. (I am asserting that) The "rules of the game" that determines where the country reaches equilibrium are the governing constitutions of the countries. Therefore, things like voting rules (first past the post, electoral college etc.), enshrined laws (right to bear arms, religious freedom), legal structure (relationship between law making, law enforcement and judgements) all affect where the equilibrium ends up. This is in contrast to the laws that are actually changed under that legal structure. Stuff like taxation law, immigration law etc. will tend not to be able to affect the equilibrium. War and constitutional challenges will potentially affect the equilibrium.
This is the reason voters become increasingly cynical in stable democracies. Voting seems increasingly to be an empty affair, devoid of real options.

Basic assumptions, Geopolitics

How do we sensibly (or even semi-scientifically) discuss the geopolitical issues amongst varying opinions? In Klaus Rhode's entry:Iraq war casualties and Iran, he takes a court-case type of paradigm for analysis. There is an apportionment of blame for, say deaths in Iraq since the war, proven crimes formerly by Iraq, current suspected and proven crimes by Iran and Iranians. This is then taken as a basis for what actions various countries should take, including the US, and whether these actions would be legal, and the likely consequences of taking action or not. My greatest objection to this paradigm is that it doesn't come close to reflecting reality. There is no world court to speak of, laws of nations are still competing with the law of the gun, misdeeds related to war-like actions cannot be brought to justice 999 times out of 1000. Apportionment of blame is realistic in situations (within borders of countries) that have good separation of powers, lots of resources for justice compared to the number of crimes, and little motivation for state-sponsored crime. These three things are not anywhere near happening in the middle east or geopolitically in general, making the paradigm nearly useless as a tool for discussion and analysis.
An example in point I can make for clarity is the use of human shields in Serbia during the war in Kosovo. If civilians are placed in strategic locations that are known to be bomb targets; is the country that dropped the bombs or the country that put them in harms way to blame if they die? Discussions quickly turn from who is to blame to how successful the strategy is. I am the kind of person that can think at the same time that an action is wrong and immoral, and also that if I was placed in that position, that it would be the best move to make. When leaders make decisions based solely on strategy rather than because international laws tell them to, a court case analogy loses all its predictive power and therefore its relevance. When strategy is the main motivating factor for discretionary decisions, game theory gives the best predictive qualities. This is why I can seem to be a game theory ideologue. To take the Iran (potential for the US to make bomb strikes on them) issue: To say that it would cause mass deaths, and would be illegal under international law misses the point entirely. Whether the powers that be decide to go down that path also depends on what Iran does (or "their move"). That Iran would continue toward a nuclear threshold even though they realise that there is an invisible line over which if they cross, the risk of war continues to rise, even if they don't quite know where that line lies, means that they are not afraid of war. The future of their citizens (and in the long term themselves), is also partly in their hands and the provocations they make. The Iraq example should demonstrate that the US is not that afraid of casualties, nor of a protracted conflict. Even if it doesn't deter Iran, it would probably deter others.

Lightbulbs - It's a scam

(re Australia's phase-out of incandescent lightbulbs) Ok, So there are no apparent victims, but it is the principle that matters the most. Intelligent citizens of democracies should always regard popular policies with very high degrees of suspicion. After all things like import quotas, tarriffs etc. are popular, but intelligent people know that they are basically scams. This scam is similar to our "Water-Wise" advertising scam. In this scam, local governments advertise how everyone should be saving water through the summer. Then, about a week after a severe downpour they advertise how little water everyone's been using and claim their water-wise campaign a huge success. Similarly, the government could have said they are phasing out film-type cameras (perhaps citing the energy intensive nature of producing the silver required in them or something) in favour of less polluting digital cameras. They could then advertise how little film is being used in Australia and claim their phase-out a raging success. Similarly with CRT TV's and LCD type ones. I guess the nature of this scam will be demonstrated by the comparison of incandescent lightbulb usage in Australia compared to a country that didn't advertise a phase-out. News items that feature a popular law change should be given the same regard as emails that tell you that you have won a prize. If it sounds too good to be true, then it probably is just good politics/marketing.

Freakonomics analysis of Swimming sportsmen

The book analysed extensively the level of corruption in Sumo-wrestling, a high profile Japanese sport. So why not a high profile Australian sport. I shall resist naming names, but there are times when I am suspicious given the incentives.

1) Selection trials often get in the way of "tapering" the training regime. ie, faster times would be more likely at big meets, if one could avoid having to swim hard to qualify, rather than sticking to a training regime.

2) This is more of a problem in longer races eg. 550m or 1320 meter races, for instance, and not so much for the 90m and 180m type distances.

3) The general public doesn't really know the qualifying rules, while top swimmers would know if there was a way to get into an event without swimming in the qualifying final.

4) A casual, pre-race gentleman's agreement between swimmers is unlikely if they are coached by different coaches.

5) In certain races, it is very easy to predict the places each swimmer will get, in advance, if there is considerable difference between them.

6) It is quite easy to fake a false start.

7) If you are going to false start, better it be in the first heat, rather than the final, so that you didn't waste that energy qualifying for the final for nothing.

8) How does a swimmer get a jaw injury that requires surgery, and how come his mouth can open so wide afterwards.

Game Theory 101

I was casually browsing the web googling game theory, and the third lecture listed on a university schedule explained the "tragedy of the commons" game/situation. It escapes me why this stuff isn't taught in primary school alongside other special interest science stuff they learn, such as the environment etc, but I digress. A critical lesson is that if a situation can be proved as such, the solutions, though obviously difficult should be obvious. The trick is always about reorganising such that the common resource is no longer common.
The less talked about opposite twin of the situation is the "tragedy of the anti-commons" This is rarer, but any argument against Kyoto would have to play up the possibility of this occuring.

Is it good for the democratic pincer movement?

Looking back st my Januarydemocracy in palestine post, my model would dictate that an economically destitute Lebanon would be bad for its democracy in the medium term. This would entrench the non-democratic regimes of sponsoring neighbours for a while, making a greater satan, little satan steamroller more effective than constant democratic pressure from their own citizens for regime change.

It's not global warming

It's civilization's practice run for the rare but certain future catastrophic events. A warm-up run if you like. If we can't handle everything that global warming throws at us, how can we ever hope to cope with the next asteroid strike etc.

It's like my previous post. If we're too afraid to get ourselves embroiled in local minor conflicts, how are we ever going to cope with the big ones.

I think this is the strongest argument for listening to young Bjorn and lower our priority of counteracting greenhouse gases over other environmental concerns. Unless of course that means we won't build any more hydro or nuclear power stations :)