Still doing more Comments on Economist.com than my usual blog sphere of reading.
Subjects of interest include:
China
Iraq
green taxes
superannuation
oil
carbon footprint
Australian immigration/guest workers
Showing posts with label Iraq. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Iraq. Show all posts
Thursday, June 19, 2008
Thursday, May 29, 2008
The coming oil price crash
There are numerous "experts" talking up the price of oil. Like at the end of the Dot.com boom, I believe this is a technique to give those in the know time to sell dud futures to those that aren't. As far as reality is concerned, supply and demand are nearing that elusive intersection. From the demand side:
US demand has already slumed 10% on some figures
from this article.
On these figures, the US demand will drop much faster than it will pick up in China, in barrels per day terms.
On the supply side, there are several increases in capacity going on in Saudi Arabia, and Iraq production has stabilised and is likely to increase, if anything. oil saviour? perhaps.
Consumer committment to reducing petrol usage has finally started happen in several countries. For the layman this means that even if petrol prices suddenly drop, consumers are likely to keep to these committments, without the usual usage surge that happens with lower prices.
As far as when? goes, the US is stocking up on fuel for the summer driving season. When the oil companies realise few are driving this will reduce the price a little bit. China is stocking up big time for the Olympics and internal aid. Once the Olympics are done and there is spare, the oil price will plummet.
Yes I'm talking down the oil price, but does anyone listen? :) we'll see....
US demand has already slumed 10% on some figuresfrom this article.
On these figures, the US demand will drop much faster than it will pick up in China, in barrels per day terms.
On the supply side, there are several increases in capacity going on in Saudi Arabia, and Iraq production has stabilised and is likely to increase, if anything. oil saviour? perhaps.
Consumer committment to reducing petrol usage has finally started happen in several countries. For the layman this means that even if petrol prices suddenly drop, consumers are likely to keep to these committments, without the usual usage surge that happens with lower prices.
As far as when? goes, the US is stocking up on fuel for the summer driving season. When the oil companies realise few are driving this will reduce the price a little bit. China is stocking up big time for the Olympics and internal aid. Once the Olympics are done and there is spare, the oil price will plummet.
Yes I'm talking down the oil price, but does anyone listen? :) we'll see....
Tuesday, May 20, 2008
Narrative II
Clam's narrative in italics
Let us begin with the way the world was twenty-five years ago. It was in the last years of a titanic struggle between two great powers, and every single event that happened anywhere in the world was seen, and had to be seen, firstly and most importantly in relation to that titanic struggle. What opportunities did it afford for the advantage of our side? What opportunities for the other side? Who benefited in the long term, in the short term? It was an age of game theory in international relations, of conspiracy theories that were credible and even true, of brinksmanship and mind-numbing terror. Perhaps you do not remember it like that. This is my narrative, and I am saying how I remember things.
In that titanic struggle our side, the West, supported many unworthy allies; in a calculated fashion, because those allies were important in in the existential struggle. Hence Suharto, the Shah, Pinochet, at certain times a certain Iraqi strongman.
In the milieu in which I lived, I breathed in a certain cynicism about this titanic stuggle. Sure, our side was ours, but we were not enthusiastic partisans. Our side had high ideals, and failed to live up to them; the other side, too, professed high ideals, and likewise failed to live up to them. They were two great grey colossi locked in an interminable struggle. We were weary unto death of their fighting and wanted something, anything, to make it end.
One day it ended. We had won.
Over the next few years- the next several years- it gradually dawned on me that my cynicism had been misplaced. The other side had been, in its essence, wrong and evil, and our side was, in its essence, right and good. The crimes that had been committed by our side had been committed, rightly or wrongly, as calculated moves in a struggle against a far greater evil. The crimes of the other side had been committed as calculated moves to still all voices of opposition and dehumanise mankind.
I realise this must sound breathtakingly naïve to many people. But I think there is no other plausible reading of the historical evidence. I am prepared to justify it at appalling length in subsequent posts.
Almost the last, but far from the least evil to spring from this titanic struggle happened in the first half of 1991. A tyrant who had made unprovoked war on most of his neighbours, who had caused the deaths of upward of a million people, who was a bad egg overall, had been brought to bay by a vast alliance of many nations. He could have been cast down, as all tyrants should be cast down, with relative ease. And yet he was not. President George Bush called upon the oppressed people of Iraq to rebel against their ruler, and did not aid them as they fought and died. The vast armies were dispersed and sent back to their homes. The tyrant remained in power. Why was this allowed to happen?
This was clear to me then as it is now. This was a judgement call. It was plausible then as now that things could have gone really badly even if he was thrown out. For the purposes of the narrative I will accept as an axiom that it was a mistake to leave him in power, and the interpretation of the Cold War as outlined above.
I remember the removal of Saddam from power being a bipartisan policy throughout the 1990s, once the habits of thought of the Cold War began to recede. I was angry about sanctions. I was angry about the bombings of 1998. I was angry then because these things because they impacted disproportionately on innocent civilians, and they had no hope of achieving what is most precious to God, in the words of Baha’ullah, which is justice. The invasion of Iraq was carried out to make amends for the shame of 1991 and bring this long overdue justice. It was obvious that it should be done, long before 2001.
The New World Order TM as I saw it had developed to the extent that a large chunk of the society deemed that the UN was, for good or ill, the only arbiter of such interventions. This worked acceptably in the break-up of ex-Yugoslavia. Iraq was different in as much as Saddam had a grudge against the US in particular. For the US, Iraq was unfinished business. Saddam took delight in defiance, in particular, defiance the US. In short, it was personal. There was umpteen other tyrants that did equally bad things over the 25 years. I could argue that many of these were equivalently evil and ripe for intervention. I would personally argue that it is a greater shame that Mugabe has avoided being toppled, for instance.
* It seemed quite clear from the pronouncements of George Bush et al that the goal of the invasion was what I have said above, to crush a wicked despot like a weevil.
The goals were more multi-faceted than that. I have argued that leaving armies go completely idle means that when they are needed, they will be almost useless (as most of those in Europe are). As I said, with Iraq, it was a little more personal. Saddam was so cocky he thought he could keep Kuwait. Taunting the western world by continuing to preside over a once great country that was becoming a failed state. Essentially again, invading was a judgement call. Crushing Saddam was a primary goal, but to see it as being completely unselfish in terms of what was judged to be good for the US or even for its president's legacy is quite partisan.
* In a move stupid in retrospect, George Bush et al sought to obtain an imprimatur from the United Nations for the invasion. This brought the Weapons of Mass Destruction issue to the forefront, because the UN resolutions that Iraq had flouted were concernd with these.
Again, one way or another this was a judgement call. Perhaps George wanted to give Saddam the false impression that he may yet avoid invasion. Perhaps he wanted to be sure there *wasn't* any mass destructive weapons before invasion. The New World Order TM works better if there is some sort of UN rubber stamp. In terms of TNWOTM the outcome of the war was that it is completely on hold as far as removing tyrants is concerned, and more to the point, removing tyrants is so burdensome for the US that it will only happen when it gets personal or close to home for the US.
* Because Iraq had not complied with these resolutions, a murderous regime of sanctions was daily punishing the Iraqi people.
Saddam had set it up such that invasion would punish them way more than even sanctions.
* Everyone was agreed that the Despot had Weapons of Mass Destruction: the French, the Russians, Uncle Tom Cobbley, etc. If anyone had good evidence to the contrary, they sat on it.
There was so much bluff and double bluff, exaggeration and downplay over this, that everyone in every party could reasonably be accused of being a liar.
Lying is a great handle for launching partisan attacks, and like children overboard it is milked for all it's worth well after it has been acted on as if true when the lie was being told. Lying should not be considered as part of a narrative, but as a springboard for launching partisan attacks.
So my narrative is that motivation for war (Gulf War I and II) is 90% American values("Blooding" the military, revenge for 9/11 related riks, unfinished business from Gulf War I) and only 10% Aslan values. Despots can do anything they like to people in their own country without risk of invasion(see Darfur, Zimbabwe), but if you make it personal for Americans and their president, you will be taken to task, and *Americans will be happy to risk lives in the struggle and the aftermath*. Serbia may well be a counterpoint to this narrative because it wasn't personal. However, it was personal for NATO as a whole. For the Americans it was rather a cowardly but militarily effective testing ground for new smart weapons. It took all of two *Accidental* helicopter US deaths to put a whole ground offensive to a halt for months. Serbia was just a much easier judgement call than Iraq or say Serbia when Bosnia was being throttled. There was talk even then of the US attacking them, but without the cover of a UN mandate, was geopolitically unwise.
So in conclusion, I want more Aslan values and less American values in nation-building excercises. I will protest the war inasmuch that if they open the door by saying it is about justice, then accept criticism about the way it is delivered. If you open the door by saying it is about WMD, then accept that this action is outside of the bounds of The New World Order TM, and other countries or the UN do not have the responsibility in the aftermath. Above all note that all breaches of Aslan style behaviour in this and any conflict will make it harder to pursue future acts of justice outside of The New World Order TM.
Let us begin with the way the world was twenty-five years ago. It was in the last years of a titanic struggle between two great powers, and every single event that happened anywhere in the world was seen, and had to be seen, firstly and most importantly in relation to that titanic struggle. What opportunities did it afford for the advantage of our side? What opportunities for the other side? Who benefited in the long term, in the short term? It was an age of game theory in international relations, of conspiracy theories that were credible and even true, of brinksmanship and mind-numbing terror. Perhaps you do not remember it like that. This is my narrative, and I am saying how I remember things.
In that titanic struggle our side, the West, supported many unworthy allies; in a calculated fashion, because those allies were important in in the existential struggle. Hence Suharto, the Shah, Pinochet, at certain times a certain Iraqi strongman.
In the milieu in which I lived, I breathed in a certain cynicism about this titanic stuggle. Sure, our side was ours, but we were not enthusiastic partisans. Our side had high ideals, and failed to live up to them; the other side, too, professed high ideals, and likewise failed to live up to them. They were two great grey colossi locked in an interminable struggle. We were weary unto death of their fighting and wanted something, anything, to make it end.
One day it ended. We had won.
Over the next few years- the next several years- it gradually dawned on me that my cynicism had been misplaced. The other side had been, in its essence, wrong and evil, and our side was, in its essence, right and good. The crimes that had been committed by our side had been committed, rightly or wrongly, as calculated moves in a struggle against a far greater evil. The crimes of the other side had been committed as calculated moves to still all voices of opposition and dehumanise mankind.
I realise this must sound breathtakingly naïve to many people. But I think there is no other plausible reading of the historical evidence. I am prepared to justify it at appalling length in subsequent posts.
Almost the last, but far from the least evil to spring from this titanic struggle happened in the first half of 1991. A tyrant who had made unprovoked war on most of his neighbours, who had caused the deaths of upward of a million people, who was a bad egg overall, had been brought to bay by a vast alliance of many nations. He could have been cast down, as all tyrants should be cast down, with relative ease. And yet he was not. President George Bush called upon the oppressed people of Iraq to rebel against their ruler, and did not aid them as they fought and died. The vast armies were dispersed and sent back to their homes. The tyrant remained in power. Why was this allowed to happen?
This was clear to me then as it is now. This was a judgement call. It was plausible then as now that things could have gone really badly even if he was thrown out. For the purposes of the narrative I will accept as an axiom that it was a mistake to leave him in power, and the interpretation of the Cold War as outlined above.
I remember the removal of Saddam from power being a bipartisan policy throughout the 1990s, once the habits of thought of the Cold War began to recede. I was angry about sanctions. I was angry about the bombings of 1998. I was angry then because these things because they impacted disproportionately on innocent civilians, and they had no hope of achieving what is most precious to God, in the words of Baha’ullah, which is justice. The invasion of Iraq was carried out to make amends for the shame of 1991 and bring this long overdue justice. It was obvious that it should be done, long before 2001.
The New World Order TM as I saw it had developed to the extent that a large chunk of the society deemed that the UN was, for good or ill, the only arbiter of such interventions. This worked acceptably in the break-up of ex-Yugoslavia. Iraq was different in as much as Saddam had a grudge against the US in particular. For the US, Iraq was unfinished business. Saddam took delight in defiance, in particular, defiance the US. In short, it was personal. There was umpteen other tyrants that did equally bad things over the 25 years. I could argue that many of these were equivalently evil and ripe for intervention. I would personally argue that it is a greater shame that Mugabe has avoided being toppled, for instance.
* It seemed quite clear from the pronouncements of George Bush et al that the goal of the invasion was what I have said above, to crush a wicked despot like a weevil.
The goals were more multi-faceted than that. I have argued that leaving armies go completely idle means that when they are needed, they will be almost useless (as most of those in Europe are). As I said, with Iraq, it was a little more personal. Saddam was so cocky he thought he could keep Kuwait. Taunting the western world by continuing to preside over a once great country that was becoming a failed state. Essentially again, invading was a judgement call. Crushing Saddam was a primary goal, but to see it as being completely unselfish in terms of what was judged to be good for the US or even for its president's legacy is quite partisan.
* In a move stupid in retrospect, George Bush et al sought to obtain an imprimatur from the United Nations for the invasion. This brought the Weapons of Mass Destruction issue to the forefront, because the UN resolutions that Iraq had flouted were concernd with these.
Again, one way or another this was a judgement call. Perhaps George wanted to give Saddam the false impression that he may yet avoid invasion. Perhaps he wanted to be sure there *wasn't* any mass destructive weapons before invasion. The New World Order TM works better if there is some sort of UN rubber stamp. In terms of TNWOTM the outcome of the war was that it is completely on hold as far as removing tyrants is concerned, and more to the point, removing tyrants is so burdensome for the US that it will only happen when it gets personal or close to home for the US.
* Because Iraq had not complied with these resolutions, a murderous regime of sanctions was daily punishing the Iraqi people.
Saddam had set it up such that invasion would punish them way more than even sanctions.
* Everyone was agreed that the Despot had Weapons of Mass Destruction: the French, the Russians, Uncle Tom Cobbley, etc. If anyone had good evidence to the contrary, they sat on it.
There was so much bluff and double bluff, exaggeration and downplay over this, that everyone in every party could reasonably be accused of being a liar.
Lying is a great handle for launching partisan attacks, and like children overboard it is milked for all it's worth well after it has been acted on as if true when the lie was being told. Lying should not be considered as part of a narrative, but as a springboard for launching partisan attacks.
So my narrative is that motivation for war (Gulf War I and II) is 90% American values("Blooding" the military, revenge for 9/11 related riks, unfinished business from Gulf War I) and only 10% Aslan values. Despots can do anything they like to people in their own country without risk of invasion(see Darfur, Zimbabwe), but if you make it personal for Americans and their president, you will be taken to task, and *Americans will be happy to risk lives in the struggle and the aftermath*. Serbia may well be a counterpoint to this narrative because it wasn't personal. However, it was personal for NATO as a whole. For the Americans it was rather a cowardly but militarily effective testing ground for new smart weapons. It took all of two *Accidental* helicopter US deaths to put a whole ground offensive to a halt for months. Serbia was just a much easier judgement call than Iraq or say Serbia when Bosnia was being throttled. There was talk even then of the US attacking them, but without the cover of a UN mandate, was geopolitically unwise.
So in conclusion, I want more Aslan values and less American values in nation-building excercises. I will protest the war inasmuch that if they open the door by saying it is about justice, then accept criticism about the way it is delivered. If you open the door by saying it is about WMD, then accept that this action is outside of the bounds of The New World Order TM, and other countries or the UN do not have the responsibility in the aftermath. Above all note that all breaches of Aslan style behaviour in this and any conflict will make it harder to pursue future acts of justice outside of The New World Order TM.
Monday, May 19, 2008
Counter - Narrative:Must provide a good example/that's not how you win wars anyway!
This is a counter-narrative that I'd kind of given up on when the build up to the Iraq war started back in 02, but on reflection, I think it still is of great intellectual and theoretical importance. It is based on my theory of the trade of "Sympathy". When a country/entity gets brutally attacked (eg.'s Jews in WWII, 9/11, Pearl Harbour, Suicide bombings, Hiroshima, Blitzkrieg bombings etc.), that which gets attacked obtains a sympathy credit. When a country/entity retaliates, anything close to proportional retaliation cashes in that credit.
In modern day geopolitical confrontation, keeping and holding that sympathy credit (ie. avoiding retaliation) is key to winning the peace. Revenge is something that never wins the peace, and retribution should be left to any court of law that can decide on it.
An important side note is that "who shoots first" is of absolute critical importance both in a battle sense and in a declaration of war sense. Thus no matter how rediculous it sounds, the US would be seen to be a World leader much more, would be seen to have absolute moral integrity within the UN, and would have been that much closer to a new world order in which it was the moral leader, had they either not attacked Iraq, or had waited (even indefinitely) for them to "shoot first".
Thus East Timor wins the peace in their country, partly because they didn't retaliate proportionally (nor request other countries to do so on their behalf).
Israel appears to be gradually cashing in their sympathy credit ever since the end of WWII, Australians in Afghanistan (etc.) are winning sympathy credits due to their rules of engagement which prohibits them from shooting until fired upon. The Iraq war has cashed in all (and then some) of the sympathy that the US had left over from 9/11.
Thus the war in Iraq was wrong on the count that it did not show a good example for other world citizens, and anyway, that is not how wars are won.
In modern day geopolitical confrontation, keeping and holding that sympathy credit (ie. avoiding retaliation) is key to winning the peace. Revenge is something that never wins the peace, and retribution should be left to any court of law that can decide on it.
An important side note is that "who shoots first" is of absolute critical importance both in a battle sense and in a declaration of war sense. Thus no matter how rediculous it sounds, the US would be seen to be a World leader much more, would be seen to have absolute moral integrity within the UN, and would have been that much closer to a new world order in which it was the moral leader, had they either not attacked Iraq, or had waited (even indefinitely) for them to "shoot first".
Thus East Timor wins the peace in their country, partly because they didn't retaliate proportionally (nor request other countries to do so on their behalf).
Israel appears to be gradually cashing in their sympathy credit ever since the end of WWII, Australians in Afghanistan (etc.) are winning sympathy credits due to their rules of engagement which prohibits them from shooting until fired upon. The Iraq war has cashed in all (and then some) of the sympathy that the US had left over from 9/11.
Thus the war in Iraq was wrong on the count that it did not show a good example for other world citizens, and anyway, that is not how wars are won.
Tuesday, May 13, 2008
Alternate Narrative on Mesopotamia
In response to:
Doctor Clam's elegant intellectual take on attitudes to war in Mesopotamia
Who is after an alternate intellectual narrative (from the left)
I have the following link to offer with my recommended comment snipped.
Economist article on Iraq, Iran and US
Azr@el wrote:
May 10, 2008 17:13
Where does the economist find such clueless journalist? Look at the problem from the desired end results from the view of the three outside players involved; what is an ideal Iraq in Iranian eyes? What is an ideal Iraq in Sunni Arab eyes? What is an ideal Iraq in U.S. eyes? The Iranian's want a demilitarized Iraq run by Shia's with a friendly Kurdish choir. Their tool to achieve this goal? The ballot box and a little ethnic spring cleaning of recalcitrant Sunnis. Their major problem? Pan-Arabist Shias trying to hijack the show. Sunni Arabs? They want a strong man of Sunni Arab persuasion to restore the good old days of pre-Kuwait Saddam. Their instrument? Money to al-qaeda-lite, political isolation of the Shia Iraqi government and of course foreign Sunni fighters by the truckload. Their major obstacle? History and demographics, neither favors them. The U.S. ? No one, especially no one in the white house has the slightest clue what an ideal endgame would look like.
The point being that it is very much (at least) a three entity game even in its simplest working model. There appears a distinct possibility that each entity is following optimal strategies,there is a Nash equilibrium of sorts, and that the endgame is a generation away. The "oil security" issue will only gradually improve, as the main players realise that security is unlikely to get much better or much worse for a long time yet.
Doctor Clam's elegant intellectual take on attitudes to war in Mesopotamia
Who is after an alternate intellectual narrative (from the left)
I have the following link to offer with my recommended comment snipped.
Economist article on Iraq, Iran and US
Azr@el wrote:
May 10, 2008 17:13
Where does the economist find such clueless journalist? Look at the problem from the desired end results from the view of the three outside players involved; what is an ideal Iraq in Iranian eyes? What is an ideal Iraq in Sunni Arab eyes? What is an ideal Iraq in U.S. eyes? The Iranian's want a demilitarized Iraq run by Shia's with a friendly Kurdish choir. Their tool to achieve this goal? The ballot box and a little ethnic spring cleaning of recalcitrant Sunnis. Their major problem? Pan-Arabist Shias trying to hijack the show. Sunni Arabs? They want a strong man of Sunni Arab persuasion to restore the good old days of pre-Kuwait Saddam. Their instrument? Money to al-qaeda-lite, political isolation of the Shia Iraqi government and of course foreign Sunni fighters by the truckload. Their major obstacle? History and demographics, neither favors them. The U.S. ? No one, especially no one in the white house has the slightest clue what an ideal endgame would look like.
The point being that it is very much (at least) a three entity game even in its simplest working model. There appears a distinct possibility that each entity is following optimal strategies,there is a Nash equilibrium of sorts, and that the endgame is a generation away. The "oil security" issue will only gradually improve, as the main players realise that security is unlikely to get much better or much worse for a long time yet.
Friday, April 27, 2007
Public vs Private - MILITARY
It is surprising that in all my years, I haven't seen an Economist article debating whether defence forces should be privatised and to what extent. Klaus Rohde touches an aspect in Private wars. In my own experience the first time I really thought about was after reading "Green Mars" (Kim Stanley Robertson) a future history novel in which the security arms of multinational companies became huge private armies. Two questions I ask myself are
- What examples of private armies in the world have been shown to be more effective than the standard sort? and
- Should we presume that privatised armies will allocate resources more efficiently, and therefore be more cost effective, or even decisive in situations where resources are subject to extensive competition?
The standard analogical analysis by the Economist leads one to believe that it is more efficient to list those things which shouldn't be privatised because it is a very short list.
As an answer to my first question, a small army of terrorists (these are almost exclusively privately run but funded by sponsoring Governments) can often "defeat" (ie. send packing to go home) a much larger, modern conventional army. I would expect that private "security" companies may have greater success at sticking out a long protracted conflict, and at a much smaller cost in say Iraq.
As an answer to my second question, there is extensive competition for human resources in a conflict situation. These are allocated much more efficiently in a terrorist organisation than in conventional armies. Western world organisations don't seem to be in the market for humans who will readily give up their life to kill for political reasons, but perhaps private security organisations from those countries are recruiting from the same pool of "brave fanatics".
- What examples of private armies in the world have been shown to be more effective than the standard sort? and
- Should we presume that privatised armies will allocate resources more efficiently, and therefore be more cost effective, or even decisive in situations where resources are subject to extensive competition?
The standard analogical analysis by the Economist leads one to believe that it is more efficient to list those things which shouldn't be privatised because it is a very short list.
As an answer to my first question, a small army of terrorists (these are almost exclusively privately run but funded by sponsoring Governments) can often "defeat" (ie. send packing to go home) a much larger, modern conventional army. I would expect that private "security" companies may have greater success at sticking out a long protracted conflict, and at a much smaller cost in say Iraq.
As an answer to my second question, there is extensive competition for human resources in a conflict situation. These are allocated much more efficiently in a terrorist organisation than in conventional armies. Western world organisations don't seem to be in the market for humans who will readily give up their life to kill for political reasons, but perhaps private security organisations from those countries are recruiting from the same pool of "brave fanatics".
Tuesday, April 10, 2007
Basic assumptions, Geopolitics
How do we sensibly (or even semi-scientifically) discuss the geopolitical issues amongst varying opinions? In Klaus Rhode's entry:Iraq war casualties and Iran, he takes a court-case type of paradigm for analysis. There is an apportionment of blame for, say deaths in Iraq since the war, proven crimes formerly by Iraq, current suspected and proven crimes by Iran and Iranians. This is then taken as a basis for what actions various countries should take, including the US, and whether these actions would be legal, and the likely consequences of taking action or not. My greatest objection to this paradigm is that it doesn't come close to reflecting reality. There is no world court to speak of, laws of nations are still competing with the law of the gun, misdeeds related to war-like actions cannot be brought to justice 999 times out of 1000. Apportionment of blame is realistic in situations (within borders of countries) that have good separation of powers, lots of resources for justice compared to the number of crimes, and little motivation for state-sponsored crime. These three things are not anywhere near happening in the middle east or geopolitically in general, making the paradigm nearly useless as a tool for discussion and analysis.
An example in point I can make for clarity is the use of human shields in Serbia during the war in Kosovo. If civilians are placed in strategic locations that are known to be bomb targets; is the country that dropped the bombs or the country that put them in harms way to blame if they die? Discussions quickly turn from who is to blame to how successful the strategy is. I am the kind of person that can think at the same time that an action is wrong and immoral, and also that if I was placed in that position, that it would be the best move to make. When leaders make decisions based solely on strategy rather than because international laws tell them to, a court case analogy loses all its predictive power and therefore its relevance. When strategy is the main motivating factor for discretionary decisions, game theory gives the best predictive qualities. This is why I can seem to be a game theory ideologue. To take the Iran (potential for the US to make bomb strikes on them) issue: To say that it would cause mass deaths, and would be illegal under international law misses the point entirely. Whether the powers that be decide to go down that path also depends on what Iran does (or "their move"). That Iran would continue toward a nuclear threshold even though they realise that there is an invisible line over which if they cross, the risk of war continues to rise, even if they don't quite know where that line lies, means that they are not afraid of war. The future of their citizens (and in the long term themselves), is also partly in their hands and the provocations they make. The Iraq example should demonstrate that the US is not that afraid of casualties, nor of a protracted conflict. Even if it doesn't deter Iran, it would probably deter others.
An example in point I can make for clarity is the use of human shields in Serbia during the war in Kosovo. If civilians are placed in strategic locations that are known to be bomb targets; is the country that dropped the bombs or the country that put them in harms way to blame if they die? Discussions quickly turn from who is to blame to how successful the strategy is. I am the kind of person that can think at the same time that an action is wrong and immoral, and also that if I was placed in that position, that it would be the best move to make. When leaders make decisions based solely on strategy rather than because international laws tell them to, a court case analogy loses all its predictive power and therefore its relevance. When strategy is the main motivating factor for discretionary decisions, game theory gives the best predictive qualities. This is why I can seem to be a game theory ideologue. To take the Iran (potential for the US to make bomb strikes on them) issue: To say that it would cause mass deaths, and would be illegal under international law misses the point entirely. Whether the powers that be decide to go down that path also depends on what Iran does (or "their move"). That Iran would continue toward a nuclear threshold even though they realise that there is an invisible line over which if they cross, the risk of war continues to rise, even if they don't quite know where that line lies, means that they are not afraid of war. The future of their citizens (and in the long term themselves), is also partly in their hands and the provocations they make. The Iraq example should demonstrate that the US is not that afraid of casualties, nor of a protracted conflict. Even if it doesn't deter Iran, it would probably deter others.
Tuesday, February 13, 2007
Tail wagging the dog?
John Howard's comments on US policy (policey?) in Iraq has really stirred things up. This is how Australia will become the world's best police - by policing the world's police with the most effective firepower (USA).
Wednesday, February 07, 2007
Iran and the surge?
Some hardline posturing has been going on recently, which is making me think that the "surge" is also a message aimed at Iran. An assumption of hostilities with Iran changes all my reckoning with what is good strategy. Iraq in this case is just a huge training ground for possible Iran related operations. Therefore, the longer time and lots of troops just means they are better trained and battle-hardened for the next phase. Reminds me of a recent game of Caesar IV.
Monday, January 29, 2007
Subliminal messages in "documentaries"
An Inconvenient Truth:
Scientific message: Anthropogenic Global Warming is real and dangerous.
Subliminal message: George Bush kills innocent animals.
Supersize Me:
Scientific message: Fast food outlet policies are unhelpful for losing weight.
Subliminal message: McDonalds is evil.
Farenheit 9/11:
Political science Message: The events of September 11th should not have resulted in war against Iraq.
Subliminal message: George W Bush is an evil warmongerer.
Scientific message: Anthropogenic Global Warming is real and dangerous.
Subliminal message: George Bush kills innocent animals.
Supersize Me:
Scientific message: Fast food outlet policies are unhelpful for losing weight.
Subliminal message: McDonalds is evil.
Farenheit 9/11:
Political science Message: The events of September 11th should not have resulted in war against Iraq.
Subliminal message: George W Bush is an evil warmongerer.
Tuesday, January 23, 2007
Iraq and "the surge" d'uh
Tactics work best with a full understanding of what tactics your "enemies" are using. Ever since 1983 and the first big suicide terrorist strike it should be clear what the terrorists achieved that time and what they have since used as a tactic. That is to remove a big army from the region at the lowest cost to themselves. These tactics will fail if proper countertactics are used. There has got to be a clear signal to the various terrorist groups that every terrorist attack on US interests in Iraq will result in more troops, not less. Thus it would have been more helpful to have started with a much smaller, more expert force, to give room to surge at every opportunity. The example I am thinking of is Australia in the Solomon Islands. There was a small complement of federal police working there, and a sniper shot and killed one. Australia immediately sent in troops. When things had calmed down somewhat, the troops quietly moved out.
Thursday, September 14, 2006
11th September, five years on
Damn right I remember what I was doing when it happened. I was just snoozing off as was my habit at that time, while Kylie would watch her various shows, channel surfing in the ads. All of a sudden, she woke me up to tell me an aeroplane had hit the world trade centre. My very first reaction was "Terrorists!". Now to explain, I had never thought of the World Trade Centre at that point as those really tall buildings in New York, but that place those islamist terrorists tried to destroy back in the 90's. I also had remembered that one of those arrested had boasted that it would be knocked over the next time. More to the point, I dragged myself to the TV and had the surreal situation of seeing the second plane hitting live. The main relevant knowledge I had of skyscrapers is that once one floor collapses, it starts a chain reaction that brings the whole building down. I was quite relieved that the initial explosions hadn't achieved that, but the flames and smoke were not dying down and were getting worse. Somewhere along the line I started to think about how my life was going to change. I cursed that I probably wouldn't get to sleep much and that those lucky sods who were already asleep would get a good night's sleep before realising that the world had changed forever. I thought about it longer and I realised that my life probably wouldn't change *that* much being in Australia. I pondered the Geopolitical significance, and my spin on it was that Al Queda was wanting to provoke a hugely disproportionate response from the US - ie. one that would make the US look like the *really* bad guys. Extrapolating from this, I figured Al Queda would have pretty much abandoned its operations in Afghanistan and moved to various other places as far as terrorist training went. I hoped in a sense that the response wouldn't be disproportionate and that the moral advantages of being the victim could propel the US to achieve diplomatic goals. I feared that one way or another, Al Queda would get their wish and have the US eventually look like the immoral, violent entity it wanted to portray. It took a lot longer than I anticipated, but it has gone full circle and now even former staunch supporters of the war agains Iraq (such as "The Economist") are demonstrating despair at the current state of affairs due to the war. I feel that what is in reality a medium term stalemate in the middle east, is ever so slowly inching towards the conditions required for progress towards stability.
Back to the date in question, I have since noticed a subtle divide between people that saw the event live and those that woke up to it in the morning. While on the night in question I thought of it as a curse to witness the horror live with confused and chaotic commentary. However in reality, after a few days I realised that seeing a moment in history unfold was a little like seeing man walk on the moon, but without advance knowledge, the witnessing of it came down to pure chance in this case. Having known about it in the morning when I woke up, I didn't tell my brother about it when I saw him at 6:00 am in the morning. He did not find out for more than a couple of hours. I thought I was doing him a favour by keeping him innocent for as long as possible, but he was still mad at me about it a full year later. As was my good friend Sandor who probably unfairly expected me to call him and wake him up so he could have also witnessed it live.
Back to the date in question, I have since noticed a subtle divide between people that saw the event live and those that woke up to it in the morning. While on the night in question I thought of it as a curse to witness the horror live with confused and chaotic commentary. However in reality, after a few days I realised that seeing a moment in history unfold was a little like seeing man walk on the moon, but without advance knowledge, the witnessing of it came down to pure chance in this case. Having known about it in the morning when I woke up, I didn't tell my brother about it when I saw him at 6:00 am in the morning. He did not find out for more than a couple of hours. I thought I was doing him a favour by keeping him innocent for as long as possible, but he was still mad at me about it a full year later. As was my good friend Sandor who probably unfairly expected me to call him and wake him up so he could have also witnessed it live.
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Tuesday, August 08, 2006
What Australia Can do to progress the middle east situation
I promised I would actually put something down along these lines, but it is quite difficult to get all of my thoughts straight. So I'll try to put something in point form.
* As a small country, and not say the leader of the free world, it is not what we do per se that makes the most difference, but the example we display.
* Our actions around the Pacific are the main thrust of this. We have shown the right way to involve our military. We have made our forces extremely accessible in situations in the Solomons, East Timor, Bougainville, Aceh, Bali, PNG just to name a few, and most importantly, have not placed any conditions and have asked for practically nothing in return.
* In the Middle East, we have punched well above our weight. We were pretty much bound to act alongside the US for the most part, however. For a long time, we have had way less fatalities and accidents than the norm. Partly, this is because our forces tend to attract less attention, and they tend to be more specialised.
* Things like knowing Arabic language, being more disciplined than the Americans, showing compassion for the ordinary citizen rather than complete fear of everyone amongst them. These are attributes which would make a helpful example to others.
* As a small country, and not say the leader of the free world, it is not what we do per se that makes the most difference, but the example we display.
* Our actions around the Pacific are the main thrust of this. We have shown the right way to involve our military. We have made our forces extremely accessible in situations in the Solomons, East Timor, Bougainville, Aceh, Bali, PNG just to name a few, and most importantly, have not placed any conditions and have asked for practically nothing in return.
* In the Middle East, we have punched well above our weight. We were pretty much bound to act alongside the US for the most part, however. For a long time, we have had way less fatalities and accidents than the norm. Partly, this is because our forces tend to attract less attention, and they tend to be more specialised.
* Things like knowing Arabic language, being more disciplined than the Americans, showing compassion for the ordinary citizen rather than complete fear of everyone amongst them. These are attributes which would make a helpful example to others.
Sunday, July 16, 2006
Lebanon, Iraq, Palestine
I feel it would be remiss of me not to revisit my opinions on the middle-east given recent escalation.
1) There was a point in time with quite a bit of optimism on three fronts - Democracy in Palestine and Iraq, Syria pulling troops out of Lebanon, and Australia and Japan working together in Iraq. Well as I expected, democratic palestine is as hopeless as totalitarian palestine, Syria pulling out of Lebanon was almost completely useless without a disarming of Hezbollah, and Japan took the opportunity to pull out at about the time we were harrassing them about the Whales (I don't believe in co-incidences). However, the current blood-thirst and chaos in Lebanon is making Iraq look stable, secure and connected to the outside world in comparison, as well as democratic.
2) This Israeli escalation is not indicative of an overall escalation, as Arab forces that were to attack in Iraq will be diverted to attack in Israel and surrounds.
3) Syria and Iran may become more vulnerable to attack, and the diplomatic cost of doing so seems to have lessened.
1) There was a point in time with quite a bit of optimism on three fronts - Democracy in Palestine and Iraq, Syria pulling troops out of Lebanon, and Australia and Japan working together in Iraq. Well as I expected, democratic palestine is as hopeless as totalitarian palestine, Syria pulling out of Lebanon was almost completely useless without a disarming of Hezbollah, and Japan took the opportunity to pull out at about the time we were harrassing them about the Whales (I don't believe in co-incidences). However, the current blood-thirst and chaos in Lebanon is making Iraq look stable, secure and connected to the outside world in comparison, as well as democratic.
2) This Israeli escalation is not indicative of an overall escalation, as Arab forces that were to attack in Iraq will be diverted to attack in Israel and surrounds.
3) Syria and Iran may become more vulnerable to attack, and the diplomatic cost of doing so seems to have lessened.
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